Introduction
In both Common and Civil law there is a residual of contracts which do not seem to suffer from any clear formation defect (fraud, coercion, misrepresentation, etc.), but nevertheless do not look right to the outsider. They look extremely disproportionate, one-sided and they raise questions as to their fairness and consequently as to their validity. 1 In almost all jurisdictions this residual category falls under the rubric of "unconscionability" in Common law 2 or something similar to the contracts against boni mores in Civil law countries. 3 Under the assumption of rationality, the power of a judge to intervene in a contract based on his intuition of fairness and social justice and not on some specific formation defects is highly problematic from an economic perspective. The doctrine of unconscionability became the object of criticism on the part of law & economics scholars quite early. 4 The question comes down to the broader issue of the relation between social justice and efficiency and especially to the issue of contract law's suitability for pursuing and achieving social justice.
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Although this is a nearly exhausted issue 6 that we will not scrutinize in this paper, we wish to call attention to two points:
(a) Contract is an ingenious mechanism for the transfer of scarce resources and not a legal fiction, a Platonic Form, a "preexisting entity of fixed dimensions" 7 . The role of contract law and more generally the state's role should be to help this mechanism operate smoothly. According to economic theory, when applying their discretionary powers in order to resolve thorny issues, judges should not rely on analogical reasoning or their intuition (or even their sense of justice), but they should rather examine the business practice and the context of the particular situation, having only one concern in mind: to realize the wishes of the parties,
given their reasonable expectations and viewing their actions as revealed preferences. These observations should not be taken to suggest that there is no place for the intervention of the state and of judges in particular. But such intervention should have as its only purpose to enforce and thus facilitate exchanges and to create, to the greatest extent possible, a "perfect market environment," by helping the market correct its failures (mainly the problems generated by significant transaction costs and imperfect information), and not by patronizing the parties.
(b)
The state has numerous other opportunities for correcting injustices and pursuing "social justice" without distorting the market and harming people. 9 Even if one doubts that the sole purpose of contract law is efficiency and the realization of the parties' wishes, one could more readily accept that other methods for the implementation of distributive justice, like taxation, are more efficient, but also more comprehensive, democratic and impartial. 10 According to this approach, a judge should not intervene in a contract when there is no case of market failure (irrationality, externalities, market power, informational asymmetries, etc.). 11 When there is such a case, i.e. once unconscionability is assumed, the problem is what a judge should do. Judicial intervention to contracts in general can be treated either from the perspective of a property rule or from the perspective of a liability rule. 12 If a property rule is followed, the judge has the option of enforcing the agreement as a whole or considering it void. The liability rule on the other hand may appear in two main forms: Under the first one, which is often the case in standard-form consumer contracts, the judge enforces the reasonable terms of the contract and disregards the rest. 13 Under the second variation of the liability rule, the judge may replace the unreasonable terms with others which he considers reasonable.
In this paper we discuss the scope of judicial revision of contracts or contractual terms which are considered unconscionable. We proceed to the analysis as follows: First we elaborate on this issue from a comparative law perspective, bringing out its practical relevance (section 2). Τhen we evaluate this rule from a law and economics point of view (section 3).
We argue that the judge should not have the power to modify a contract, especially a business contract concluded by sophisticated parties. In the case of an inefficient and abusive contract clause, a judge should not enforce it. An attempt by the judge to adjust an "unreasonable" term will create opportunism from both sides and will lead to arbitrary judicial decisions, thus upsetting the security of transactions and inevitably leading to higher transaction costs. In the conclusion (section 4) we sum up the results and mention possible extensions of the paper.
STATING THE PROBLEM FROM A COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE

Earlier history
Historically, the substantial judicial supervision of contracts, in the sense that the judge controls the balance between the performances of the parties, dates from the third century, when the Roman Emperor Diocletian issued two prescripts in order to protect the small landowners from onerous deals. 14 According to these rules, the seller was entitled to rescind the contract and reclaim the object of sale if the price was less than half the value of the thing sold. The stronger contractual party could prevent the rescission if he offered to pay the weaker party the market value for the thing sold. This doctrine, known as "laesio enormis", i.e. huge loss, became a basic principle of Roman law of obligations. Later it was evolved by Thomas Aquinas and had great influence in law in Europe in the centuries to come. 15 Such rules have been adopted by the French Civil Code of 1804 16 and the Austrian Civil Code of 1811.
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The objective control of the relation between the contractual performances of the parties was heavily criticized by the supporters of Natural law for being incompatible with the principle of freedom of will. 18 This influenced more recent codifications like the German and the Swiss ones, according to which a contract is void or may be invalidated, only if the objective disproportion of the performances is coupled with additional (subjective) elements which lead to the conclusion that the weaker party has been exploited. 
Civil law countries
In Germany, according to §138 (1) BGB a legal transaction which contradicts the boni mores is null. This provision typically applies in cases where the freedom of the weaker party is unduly restricted by means of a contract. Further, according to §138 (2) BGB, a legal transaction is void whereby a person exploiting the need, carelessness or inexperience of another, gets pecuniary advantages which exceed the value of his performance to such an extent that, under the circumstances, the pecuniary advantages are in obvious disproportion to his performance.
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In principle, such contracts are void as a whole. 21 Nevertheless, in some groups of cases, mostly in long term contracts, the judge may enforce the contract (contractual term) to the ex- 43 Cf. also Art. 1231 CC, according to which, where an undertaking has been performed in part, the agreed penalty may be lessened by the judge in proportion to the interest which the part performance has procured for the creditor, without prejudice to the application of Art. 1152 CC. The same provision is comprised in Art.1154 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Common law
The scope for the application of the doctrine of unconscionability varies from one common law country to the other. 46 According to an early definition, an unconscionable contract is, as Lord Chancellor Hardwicke put it, a contract which "[n]o man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other". 47 The remedy in such cases of abuse of bargaining position is the rescission of the contract. Partial rescission of unconscionable contracts is confronted with reluctance, let alone the judicial adjustment of contractual terms.
According to English law rescission is thought to be an all-or-nothing remedy, whose aim is to reinstate the parties to their former situation. 48 for a six-month loan of £5,000).
In the United States the doctrine of unconscionability was introduced with § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The author of the code, Karl Llewellyn, was of German origin and his approach was influenced by the German Civil Code of 1900. In addition, the particular UCC article was strongly influenced by the pivotal decision of Campbell Soup Co. v.
Wentz. 55 In that decision, Judge Herbert Goodrich 56 who wrote the opinion for the court found that a particular clause of the contract was "tough" for the growers ("carrying a good joke too far"). He emphasized (twice) that the contract was not illegal. Nevertheless he refused to enforce the problematic clause. 57 This decision led to UCC §2-302 which (under the influence of BGB) gave the court the right to "limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result". 1980 ). The court found the indefinite price escalation clause in a natural gas sales contract unconscionable and contrary to public policy. However, the court concluded: "it is a fundamental principle that a court may not make a new contract for the parties or rewrite their contract under the guise of construction" (Amoco, 467). See also 66 Am. Jur. 2d Reformation of Instruments § 1 (2001) ("Courts are not at liberty, under the guise of reformation, to rewrite the parties' agreement and foist upon the parties a contract they never made").
The Principles of European Contract law
When dealing with a problem from a comparative perspective, we should definitely refer to the projects of harmonization of law. In the field of contract law, one of the most ambitious unification works is the survey of the Principles of European Contract Law, which, in spite of its non-binding character, constitutes a benchmark, as it delineates to some degree the current discussion on European contract law.
As far as unconscionability and its legal consequences are concerned, the members of the Commission on European Contract law followed the predominant pattern of the civil law countries, 60 which was also adopted by the (1) A party may avoid a contract if, at the time of the conclusion of the contract: (a) it was dependent on or had a relationship of trust with the other party, was in economic distress or had urgent needs, was improvident, ignorant, inexperienced or lacking in bargaining skill, and (b) the other party knew or ought to have known of this and, given the circumstances and purpose of the contract, took advantage of the first party's situation in a way which was grossly unfair or took an excessive benefit. (2) Upon the request of the party entitled to avoidance, a court may if it is appropriate adapt the contract in order to bring it into accordance with what might have been agreed had the requirements of good faith and fair dealing been followed. (3) A court may similarly adapt the contract upon the request of a party receiving notice of avoidance for excessive benefit or unfair advantage, provided that this party informs the party who gave the notice promptly after receiving it and before that party has acted in reliance on it.
In the same spirit, Art. 9:509 (2) of the Principles of European Contract Law provides that "despite any agreement to the contrary the specified sum may be reduced to a reasonable amount where it is grossly excessive in relation to the loss resulting from the nonperformance and the other circumstances". This is in line with the provision of article 7.4.13. it could be a contrario concluded that it is excluded. 62
Evaluation of the results of the comparative analysis
In the foregoing analysis we showed that, at least in Europe, the judge is actively involved in the reconstruction of unconscionable contracts (or unconscionable contractual clauses) and thus functions in a way as a sort of "third contractual party". His power to adjust unreasonable contracts or contractual terms varies from one legal order to the other. Nevertheless, there seems to be a tendency that this practice will be elevated to a rule. This is also manifested by the Principles of European Contract Law. Nonetheless, in all legal systems examined there is an evident lack of consistency when dealing with cases of unconscionability:
Similar cases are treated in a different way without solid, or at least without comprehensively displayed, reasons.
On the basis of the above considerations, we believe that there is a need to develop a general theory according to which cases of unconscionability could be decided. This theory would provide answers to the questions if, when and why the judge should reconstruct contracts or adjust contractual terms. This paper aspires to constitute the first step in this direction.
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE JUDICIAL INTERVENTION TO UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS
Introductory remarks
Unconscionability is a fuzzy concept. The reason for this fuzziness is the fact that it is based on two different grounds: economic inefficiency and unfairness. As Kaplow & Shavell (2002) have demonstrated, this is deadly combination. A judge trying to assess a contract using the doctrine of unconscionability as this was developed in both Europe and the U.S. will soon discover that he has to do with criteria belonging to two different categories. He has to assess the efficiency of the contract (the absence of severe market failure) and its fairness (the 62 There is no relevant provision in the UNIDROIT principles, as consumer contracts do not fall within its scope. bargain should not be incompatible with conventional morality). 63 This bundling of two dissimilar criteria in one legal concept leads to the classical philosophical problem of "categorical mistake", i.e. to mistake one category of things for another, confounding the one with the other. 64 Categorical mistakes, besides being erroneous, also lead to indeterminacy. In the case of unconscionability the mistake has led to the indeterminate nature of the concept in almost all legal systems.
This dual nature of unconscionability was originally spotted by Arthur Leff. In a seminal article, 65 he made the distinction between "procedural" and "substantive unconscionability". Procedural unconscionability has to do with the defects in the bargaining and formation process and it largely coincides with the law & economics market failure analysis. Substantive unconscionability has to do with the result -if it seems unfair, unequal, and grossly disproportionate to the judge (or to the broader community). The first is a positive statement that can be falsified in theory or in a court of law; the second is a normative statement, thus not falsifiable. 66 From a law and economics perspective, in the case of a fair process, the intervention of the judge applying the doctrine of substantive unconscionability is paternalistic. Especially when it comes to business transactions, where parties are sophisticated, at least as concerns the demands of their ordinary business interests, rights and duties, 67 substantive unconscionability should be excluded. 68 If the judge decides to annul such a deal as unconscionable only because he does not feel right with the result, his decision will destroy the "insurance func-clause may have been reasonable ex ante. Hence the American courts "have tended to avoid square holdings that an excessive price without more is unconscionable". 70 The rule of substantive unconscionability harms in particular young inexperienced professionals and new-tothe-job businesses that cannot signal their credibility by offering terms (e.g. they might offer a twice or thrice longer period of commitment in a relation-specific investment) which a court can always strike as unconscionable. It harms in general the classes of weaker parties since an indeterminate unconscionability clause creates a barrier to entry to those without reputation, collateral or expertise. 71 In addition, a rule of substantial unconscionability may under certain circumstances prevent the production of socially valuable information.
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In the case of a defective process, the use of procedural unconscionability is rather redundant since the relief is based on the related formation defect. To this there is one possible exception, or rather redefinition: The concept of procedural unconscionability can be used as an all-encompassing term to describe the sum of minor formation defects, i.e. a situation with several minor formation defects which individually cannot justify a formation defense but as a whole permeate the entire contract, revealing a problematic bargaining environment. In this way the concept is transformed (elevated) from a residual category to a more general broad category.
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Further analysis of the above issues exceeds the scope of the paper. As already men-
tioned, in what follows we assume unconscionability, meaning that we concentrate on cases where the judge for whatever reason will consider a contract unconscionable. Irrespectively of the justifiability of his decision on law and economics grounds, we examine his options, so that even if the judge may not be prevented from considering a contract unconscionable, at least he may be prevented from opting for an inappropriate remedy.
The effects of unconscionability: A sketch of the options of the judge
The way in which the judge may deal with cases of unconscionability differs according to the nature of the defect:
(a) If the problem in a contract is a defect due to a critical market failure, or the whole bargaining was problematic due to a series of minor market failures, the judge should refuse to enforce the contract as it is. According to Craswell, 74 if the costs of the stronger party to obtain a proper consent from the weaker party are low, then the whole contract should be void (property rule). If, on the other hand, taking into account the nature of the transaction, achieving the proper consent of the weaker party to all points of the agreement is costly (e.g. complex consumer contracts), then a liability rule according to which only reasonable rules are enforced is preferable (liability rule). Concerning the unreasonable terms, the judge has two options: either to ignore them or to replace them with reasonable ones. These solutions present an important advantage as compared to the property rule, namely flexibility.
(b) If the judge cannot strike a particular clause (since there is no clear defect) and he cannot strike the entire contract. This residual category has always to do with the "balance of the contract" which seems wide of the mark. 75 The temptation of the judge to restore it (if the law permits it) is strong. 76 If the judge gives in to this temptation, the easiest and less perilous way for him to restore its balance is to modify terms like the price, the duration of a contract (e.g. in beer supply contracts), or an interest rate agreement, since these terms most of the times can be easily modified and there is no danger of an accusation of judicial activism that a more qualitative intervention would warrant. 77 Thus, it should be examined if through the revision of these terms it would be possible to restore the balance of the entire contract. It is worth noting that the abovementioned terms are key elements to the contract, meaning that no 73 And again the danger of categorical mistake is lurking. contract of the same kind can exist without such a clause. 78 Hence, a judge cannot just invalidate them and enforce the other terms of the contract (as he can with the other clauses); his only option is to modify them.
Judicial revision of key terms of the contract
No matter if the decision of the judge that a contract is unconscionable or not is justifiable, we concentrate on the examination of the effects of the different remedies he may opt for. We claim that unlike the annulment of a whole contract, the power of a judge to modify key contractual terms is problematic for several reasons:
(a) The adjustment of the price, the interest rate or other key elements of the contract by the courts leads to moral hazard by promisors who will enter frivolously into onerous agreements with the expectation that the judge will modify them in their favor, without affecting their validity. This judicial paternalism, which seeks to protect the weaker party in a specific case, will lead to irresponsible behavior by the parties, which in the long run is going to create the need for more judicial intervention and paternalism.
We believe that the judicial revision of contractual terms influences the incentives of the weaker party to a great extend, even if he is not perfectly rational. The danger of moral hazard is present in all cases, provided that a minimum of rationality is satisfied, namely when the imperfectly rational party positively knows that he can benefit in court by taking advantage of his irrationality, especially when taking into account that the exact extent of deviation of rationality of a party is extremely hard to prove.
(b) This intervention of the judge would also create incentives for opportunistic behavior by the stronger party in the contract: he can freely add one-sided terms to contracts, exorbitant price-terms, unreasonable duration clauses, since under the worst scenario he will get what he would agree with the other party in a perfect competition/contract environment.
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Moreover, an attempt by the judge to adjust an "unreasonable" term leads to adverse selection since promisees, taking into account that not all cases will be brought before courts, will design even more one-sided contracts in order to spread their losses. This inevitably leads to a vicious circle (in combination with the mirror-problem of moral hazard) with more un- 78 Cf. in Roman law "essentialia negotii". The price is essentiale negotii for a sale or a rent contract. In the same sense, the interest rate is the price for the use of capital and can thus be seen as a key term of a credit contract. The function of the duration term in beer supply contracts is similar. 79 See Craswell, supra note 25, p. 16.
conscionable terms and more defaults by untrustworthy parties.
(c) Another major problem is the principal-agent problem: a judge will regulate an agreement with inadequate knowledge of the relevant circumstances. 80 A judge by definition is not competent to decide what is best for both parties and socially efficient (either for the two parties as representatives of their respected classes or for the society as a whole). The modification of a price term makes the judge a "price commissioner", 81 the one who determines the value of a contractual performance he is not a part of. The problem of evaluation of the performance is also evident from the legal literature, where it is disputed whether the price of the contract should be adjusted according to the usual market price, the highest possible non-unconscionable price 82 or even to the price that the parties would have agreed on, if the negotiation were not flawed. 83 Even if this question is answered, further problems emerge concerning the exact calculation of the price in a specific case, especially if this is "the highest possible non-unconscionable price" or "the price to which the parties would have agreed, if the negotiation were not flawed". Ultimately, the decision of the judge will not be based on economic grounds/efficiency considerations (due to the lack of expertise and also for the difficulty in measuring subjective valuation) but to indeterminate fairness considerations. 84 In business contractual disputes this will inevitably lead to rent-seeking and corruption.
(d) A regime where judges can revise key elements in a contract like the price is bound to create too much uncertainty in the system and to undermine the security of transactions.
This uncertainty creates the incentives for inefficient actions (wasteful litigation and rent seeking) and thus augments transaction costs.
The increase in transaction costs is due not only to increase in litigation but also to in-crease in search costs (finding a reliable partner who has the reputation of performing his duties without asking for relief when difficulties arise), negotiation costs (the threat point of the promisor is higher because of the power of a judge to put a cap on the price term; taking steps to avoid procedural unconscionability) and contract drafting costs (to ensure that the relevant clauses will not be characterized as unconscionable).
In addition, the rule of judicial adjustment of contractual terms leads to an increase in litigation costs. Even if it is assumed (for the sake of the argument) that the judge will eventually decide for the efficient term, this is much more costly for him than for the contractual parties. Under this assumption, the renegotiation of a null contract by the parties is preferable to its judicial revision. 85 This is also the rationale of a rule adopted by many civil law systems, according to which in case the parties have not reached an agreement on key terms, such as the price term, it is assumed that no contract has been concluded. 86 This rule could (should)
apply in the cases we treat in this paper also, since a void agreement is a non-agreement.
(e) In the case of a doctrine of procedural unconscionability in contracts which lead to a price term modification by the judge, there is also a strong case for "second-best" arguments.
This is also true for any judicial attempt to modify a contract or invalidate a clause; however, the problem is more acute in the case of modification of fundamental clauses such as price terms. Key elements to the contract are the most unlikely ones to be the result of a formation defect, since even unsophisticated parties give great emphasis to them during negotiations, especially in business contracts. 87 Thus, a judicially reconstructed contract is in principle not the second-best solution after the perfect contract since, if the optimality condition is not satisfied, the second-best solution might require the changing of the other contractual terms (which are not optimal anymore). UCC § 2-303, according to which "the parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not settled. In such case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if (a) nothing is said as to price; or (b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree; or (c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded." According to Ayres/Gertner, supra note 85, at 96 this rule is not formed as a penalty default rule, because "to estimate a reasonable price courts can largely rely on market information…" Nevertheless, long term contracts often lead to lock-in situations: even if before the conclusion of the contract the relevant market was competitive, after the performance of the contract the costs of the weaker party to switch to another contract are very high. Thus, the weaker party would be prevented from bringing his case before the court. In anticipation of this fact, the stronger party may impose even more unconscionable terms in order to prolong the contract or simply keep to it. Typically, such conditions arise in case of lease contracts. 88 Under these circumstances, it is often claimed that the modification of the unconscionable price is preferable to its non-enforcement. 89 We believe that when dealing with such cases, a fundamental distinction should be made:
(aa) If the market is competitive, then the non-enforcement of the whole contract does not create problems, provided that the stronger party bears the switching costs. This could be the case if the strong party is held liable on the grounds of culpa in contrahendo or tort and has to compensate the weaker party. 90 If in spite of this possibility the weaker party does not wish to switch to another contract (e.g. rent another apartment), this could be seen as a revelation of the fact that the subjective value he is willing to pay for the performance of the particular lease is high and therefore the contract is not unconscionable.
(bb) On the other hand, in the case of a monopoly or collusion, the weaker party has inadequate alternatives or will be unable to obtain better contractual terms. Under these conditions, adjusting the terms of the contract instead of annulling it might save on transaction costs (i.e. the costs of the new negotiations, which in any case do not have any prospects for better results than the first ones). Even in these cases however, the intervention of the judge in 88 See supra, esp. under section 2.2.
89 This is the prevailing opinion in civil law countries. See supra section 2.2. 90 Such liability may be found in most legal systems: in Germany this obligation could be based on the new § 311 (2) Nr. 1 BGB (culpa in contrahendo) or 826 BGB (tort for intentional tort)· in Greece on 197-198 CC (culpa in contrahendo) or 919 CC (which is equivalent to § 826 BGB)· in France and Belgium on 1382 CC (general clause for torts-it also includes precontractual liability)· in Austria it is based on § 874 ABGB (see Bollengerber in Kurzkommentar ABGB, supra note 17, § 874 N. 1)· for Switzerland, see Huguenin, supra note 35, Art. 21 CO N. 18, mentioning that under such conditions the strong party is liable because of culpa in contrahendo. In common law countries, such cases may (but not always) fall within the scope of the tort of fraud. In the Principles of European Contract Law it is explicitly provided that the weaker party may claim damages from the strong one. According to art. 4:117 (a) "(1) A party who avoids a contract under this Chapter may recover from the other party damages so as to put the avoiding party as nearly as possible into the same position as if it had not concluded the contract, provided that the other party knew or ought to have known of the mistake, fraud, threat or taking of excessive benefit or unfair advantage. Likewise, according to article 3.18 of the UNIDROIT principles, "Irrespective of whether or not the contract has been avoided, the party who knew or ought to have known of the ground for avoidance is liable for damages so as to put the other party in the same position in which it would have been if it had not concluded the contract." the contract should not be seen as a durable solution. Cases of abuse of market power call for regulation, so that at least the security of transactions is safeguarded.
Judicial revision of non-key contractual terms
The notion of non-key contractual terms, as used in this paper, encompasses terms which regulate the legal implications of the agreement, like for instance the remedies for breach of contract, or append an extra clause to the contract, like for instance a penalty clause. 91 If a non-key term is unconscionable, the liability rule can be applied in both its variations: The judge may either consider that the term in question is void and apply the relevant default rules, to the extent that such rules exist and this is necessary, or he may tailor the contractual term, so that it will no longer be unconscionable.
Under both variations of the liability rule, the moral hazard of the victim cannot be avoided; the weaker party may agree on disadvantageous terms, knowing that the judge will cover for him. Likewise, in all cases of partial nullity of a contract, the security of transactions is necessarily undermined and the transaction costs -especially negotiation and litigation costs-are increased. Nevertheless, a rule of non-enforcement of unreasonable terms is cheaper for the courts to enforce and does not lead to significant principal-agent problems.
The main difference between the non enforcement of a contractual term and its judicial revision lies in the incentives of the stronger party: if he knows that unconscionable contractual terms will be completely ignored by the court, he has no incentives to behave opportunistically. He would rather agree on reasonable and enforceable terms. On the other hand, a rule under which the judge substitutes reasonable terms for unreasonable ones does not have a deterrent effect: the stronger party will at least try to add one-sided terms to the contract, since he has nothing to lose -in the worst case he will get what he would have agreed on with the other party in a perfect competition/contract environment.
At this point it is worth mentioning that the deterrent effect of the non-enforcement of an unconscionable contractual term is weaker in case the void term is substituted by a relevant default rule. Take, for instance, the case in which the judge decides that a contractual term according to which the debtor, in order to terminate his two-year long contract, shall give notice to the creditor eighteen months in advance is non enforceable. Under these circumstances the time-clause of the relevant default rule will apply instead. Hence the creditor will not be 91 Cf. in Roman Law, "accidentalia negotii".
any worse than he would be had he not acted unconscionably. Nevertheless, this solution is still preferable to the adjustment of the time clause by a judge, since statutory provisions do not jeopardize legal certainty.
CONCLUSION
Unconscionability is a doctrine which is to a great extent common to all legal systems. Nevertheless, its application varies considerably among different legal orders. The judicial reconstruction of unconscionable contracts or the adjustment of such clauses is often accepted in civil law countries. Common law countries are in principle more reluctant to grant such powers to the judge, but, as it seems, they are gradually becoming more receptive to these practices. Irrespective of the degree to which it is recognized that the judge may revise unconscionable contracts, in almost all countries inconsistencies are observed, in the sense that similar cases are treated legally in a different manner.
We claim that if the judge instead of refusing to enforce an inefficient contract or annulling an inefficient (abusive) clause he replaces it with a supposedly efficient judge-made one (for the sake of the argument let's rule say that he can find the efficient clause and he will make an efficient contract), he creates incentives for opportunism from both sides, moral hazard and adverse selection situations, as well as second-best problems. This also leads to arbitrary judicial decisions, upsets the security of transactions and it will inevitably lead to higher transaction costs (litigation, judicial, and administrative costs).
Thus, the court, instead of modifying one of the terms, should decide between enforceability and non-enforceability based on the consent and the economic function of the clause.
If the parties wish their (void) contract to be enforced, they can always renegotiate after the decision. If we limit the discretion of the judge to intervene in a contractual relationship, we achieve (among other things) two major goals: a substantial reduction of transaction costs an increase in responsibility which inevitably will lead to less need for paternalism.
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By way of an exception, the reform of an unconscionable key contractual clause may be justified in long term contracts under monopoly or oligopoly situations in extreme cases of market power abuse. 92 We can also see the impact on the incentives of contractual parties under the "penalty rule" framework, developed by Ayres/ Gertner, supra note 85.
Further research on this topic definitely needs to be carried out. A next step could be the extension of the analysis, in order to take into account the risk attitude of the contractual parties, as well as different procedural rules. Finally, it would be interesting to reexamine this issue under the light of the results of studies in behavioral economics, after having relaxed the assumption of rationality.
